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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK FUOCO and ANNA 
FUOCO, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
BENJAMIN H. 'VILLIAMS and 
VERNA V. WILLIAMS, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 
10362 
This is the second appeal from judgments of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, each favoring de-
fendants, from an action brought by plaintiffs to quiet 
title in a parcel of land approximately twenty feet 
wide along plaintiffs' east boundary line and along 
defendants' west boundary line, which is now and has 
been for over fifty ( 50) years occupied and used by 
defendants and their predecessors. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The Lower Court concluded that, in sending this 
case back for a new trial in the first appeal by this same 
plaintiff in this case, the Supreme Court did not intend 
that the issue concerning the location of the ditch in 
question be relitigated. G pon this basis the Lower Court 
assumed the jury's determination, in the first trial, 
with respect to the location of the ditch to be correct. 
It was then determined, in the second trial, that the 
only issue left to be decided was whether or not the 
particular ditch in question was acquiesced in as a bound· 
ary line by plaintiffs' predecessors and defendanh· 
·and their predecessors for a long period of time. Thi~ 
issue was again resolved in favor of the defendants. 
STATE.MEN'!' OF 'l'I-IE ISSUE TO BE 
RESOLVED ON APPEAL 
It must be determined whether or not the particular 
ditch in question was acquiesced in as a boundary line 
by plaintiffs' predecessors and by defendants' and their 
predecessors for a sufficiently Jong period of time. 
STATEl\ilENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and defendants are adjoining landown· 
ers near 3900 South and I-Iighland Drive Streets in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. Defendant, Ben 'Villiams, owns a 
tract of land located south of 39th South Street on 
the West side of Highland Drive Street. The plain· 
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tiffs, in the year 1960, purchased a parcel of land im-
mediately west of Respondents' property. (R. -!4, 47). 
The twenty ( 20) foot strip in dispute involves the 
placement of the boundary between their properties. 
Defendant, llen Williams, has lived on this property 
with his parents since he was a child. ( R. 3) . Prior 
to 193..t, an irrigation ditch was <lug between the plain-
tiffs' and defendants' properties for the purpose of irri-
gating the plaintiffs' property. The defendants claim 
their property runs west from Highland Drive Street 
to the irrigation ditch dividing the properties in ques-
tion and that the irrigation ditch has been acquiesced 
in as a boundary line dividing the two parcels for well 
over fifty ( 50) years and that said ditch is still in ex-
istence. At the previous trial the plaintiffs conceded 
that the defendants had been using the parcel up to 
the ditch since 1934, whereupon, the Lower Court limit-
ed the questions to be submitted to the jury to that 
concerning the location of the ditch. That is whether 
the irrigation ditch in question was located along Linc 
AB or Line CD? The twenty-foot strip of land in dis-
pute was shown on Exhibit P-1 by the letters "AB 
and CD". "AB" was the boundary line claimed by the 
defendants and "CD" was the line claimed by the plain-
tiffs. (Old R. 20). The jury, after hearing the evidence, 
was taken to the premises to view the same. By Special 
Y erdict, they found that the ditch forming the boundary 
line between the two parcels of land was located along 
the line All as claimed by defendants. ( 0 Id R. :J7) . 
Based upon the findings of the jury, the Lower Court 
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in the previous trial entered judgment for the defendants 
quieting title, by acquiescence, in the defendants to the 
disputed parcel. (Old R. 41-43). The plaintiffs ap-
pealed and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment 
of the trial court and remanded such for a new trial, 
stating that: 
"The judge or jury should determine the mat-
ters of whether the ditch was acquiesced in over 
a long period of time, as a boundary and not 
simply as an irrigation medium." Fuoco vs. Wil-
liams, 15 Ut.2d 156, 389 P.2d 143. 
At the new trial the Lower Court resolved the issue 
of whether or not the particular irrigation ditch was 
acquiesced in as a boundary line in favor of the de-
fendants and it is from this judgment that the present 
appeal is taken by the plaintiffs. 
, ARGU~IENT IN AFFIRMANCE 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ITS FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS HAD 
ACQUIRED Tl TLE BY ACQUIESCENCE. 
A. The court correctly relied iipon the finding made b?J 
the jury in the previous trial with respect to the lo-
cation of the particular ditch involved in this con-
troversy. 
B. The defendants did prove the long, continued 
existence of the said ditch rz.'f a rnonument definitclJI 
establishing a boundary line rnutually recognized 
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by appellants' predecessors and by defendants and 
their predecessors as such. 
A. The court correctly relied upon the finding made by 
the jury in the previous trial with respect to the lo-
cation of the particular ditch involved in this con-
troversy. 
In the earlier Supreme Court decision, Fuoco vs. 
Williams, 15 Ut.2d 156, 389 P.2d 143, in which the 
judgment for defendant, Benjamin H. 'Villiams was 
reversed and remanded for a new trial, the court said: 
"The court erred in telling the jury that the 
only question was the location of the small irri-
gation ditch, since such presentation to the jury 
was based on the assumption that the irrigation 
ditch was dug where it was for the purpose of 
establishing a boundary and not for the sole pur-
pose of irrigating the land." 
The court further stated: 
"The judgment of the trial court is reversed 
and remanded for a new trial, with instructions 
to the effect that the judge or jury should deter-
mine the matters of whether the ditch was acqui-
esced in over a long period of time, as a boundary 
and not simply as an irrigation medium." 
It is from this language and similar language 
throughout the opinion that the lower court in the pres-
ent trial correctly concluded that it was not the intent 
of the Supreme Court that the issue with respect to the 
location of the ditch be relitigaited. 
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The latter above-quoted statement of the Supreme 
Court refers specifically to the issue of acquiescence in 
the ditch (referring here to that ditch located by the 
jury in the previous trial) as a boundary line and makes 
no reference to the issue of location. From this lan-
guage it would seem that the Lower Court was correct 
in its interpretation of the Supreme Court's previous 
decision. 
It is the law in Utah that an issue which has been 
properly litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction 
is conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with 
them and cannot be relitigated in another court by the 
same parties in an action upon the same matter. Mat-
thews v. Matthews et al. (142), 102 Ut. 428, 132 P.2d 
II I. In the Matthews case the court said: 
"Public policy requires that parties ought not 
to be permitted to litigate the same issue more 
than once, and, that when a fact has been judi-
cially determined by a court of competent juris-
diction or an opportunity for such trial has been 
given, the judgment of the court so long as it 
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon 
the parties and those in privity with them in law 
or estate." 
It is respectfully submitted that the issue concern-
ing the location of the ditch was not open to relitigation 
in the present trial. 
B. The defendants did prove the long, contim1;ed 
existence of the said ditch as a monument definitely 
establishing a buundarv line mutually recognized 
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by appellants' predecessors and by defendants and 
their predecessors as such. 
Where there is no proof of an actual agreement 
the court has relied upon the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence and implied an agreement if certain ele-
ments be shown to exist. The elements which must be 
shown by the person claiming title by acquiescence are: 
( 1) occupation up to a visible line marked definitely 
by monuments, fences or buildings, ( 2) acquiescence 
in the division line as the boundary, ( 3) acquiescence 
for a long period of time and ( 4) acquiescence by ad-
joining landowners. 
Where the preceding requirements are met, a re-
buttable presumption arises that the parties have agreed 
the boundary should be the one in which they have ac-
quiesced, wholly apart from whether or not an actual 
express agreement was made. If the preswnption arises 
the burden shifts and it becomes incumbent upon the 
party who assails the title by acquiescence to show by 
competent evidence that a boundary was not thus estab-
lished. 
Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 
143; King vs. Frank, 14 Utah 135, 378 P.2d 893; Nun-
ley vs. Walker, 13 Ut.2d 105, 369 P.2d 1117; Affleck 
vs. Morgan, 12 Ut.2d 200, 36-i P.2d 663; Harding 
vs. Allen, 10 Ut.2d 370, 353 P.2d 911; Urown vs. lHil-
liner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202; Glenn vs. Whitney, 
116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257; Ringwood vs. Bradford, 
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2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053; Hummel vs. Young, 
l Utah 2d 337, 265 P.2d 410; 3 Utah Law Review. 
Plaintiffs contend that defendants failed to prove 
a "mutual recognition" of the particular irrigation 
ditch as a boundary. 
An irrigation ditch can become a boundary line 
or monument if such be the intention of the adjoining 
landowners. Monuments include such natural objects 
as mountains, streams, trees, etc., or artificial objects 
such as roads, fences, walls, ditches and other similar 
matters marked or placed on the ground by the hand 
of man. 12 Am J ur 2d (Boundaries) Sec. 4 & 5, pages 
549 thru 551. 
The record is clear that l\'Ir. Williams, the defend-
ant, and his predecessors, under claim of title, occupied 
and used the property lying immediately east of the 
ditch bank far in excess of twenty-five ( 25) years to 
the exclusion of all others. 
Plaintiffs' witness, Owen Sanders, testified that the 
property west of defendants' old barn to the east of 
the ditch in question was used by defendants and their 
predecessors as a place to throw refuse, manure, as a 
lane over which to drive their wagons and hayracks, 
as a place to grow apple trees and for gardening. 
(R. 81, 82, 85). Mr. Sanders further testified that 
to his knowledge defendants and their predecessors 
were the only persons ever to use the property east 
of the present ditch as it runs parallel to the fence 
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now m existence. (R. 86, 87). Mr. Frank Young, 
witness for plaintiffs, testified that the property west 
of the barn and to the east of the ditch was used by 
defendants and their predecessors for gardening, to 
raise corn, to grow fruit trees, in part for a corral, etc. 
(R. 109, llO). Mr. Young also testified that he has 
never seen anyone other than defendants or their prede-
cessors doing anything with the property east of the 
fence line as it is now constructed. (R. ll7). Mr. H. 
Leland Christensen, another witness for plaintiff, 
testified that he remembered defendants placing corn 
shocks on the west end of their property. (R. 137). 
Defendant Benjamin H. Williams and his sister, Mrs. 
Afton W. Marker, both testified that defendants and 
their predecessors had used and occupied the property 
in question for over 20 years-more nearly 50 years-
to the exclusion of all others under claim of title to 
the property. (R. 7, 8, 12, 28-34, 58, 59, 60, 62). 
The Supreme Court in its earlier decision, Fuoco 
vs. Williams, supra, on this matter, stated that: 
"The plaintiffs conceded that the defendants 
had been cultivating the ground up to the ditch 
for oiver 20 years." 
It is respectfully submitted that defendants were oc-
cupying and using all of the property from their east 
boundary along Highland Drive west to the ditch in 
dispute, to the exclusion of all others. 
l\fr. Frank Young, witness for plaintiffs, testified 
that Mr. Butterworth, former owner of the tract now 
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owned by plaintiff, Frank Fuoco, attempted to raise 
corn and potatoes at one time. (R. Ill). As was pointed 
out, supra, Mr. Young also testified that he has never 
seen anyone other than defendants or their predecessors 
using the property east of the ditch in question and the 
present fence line as it is now constructed. (R. 117). 
It is logical to infer from this testimony that Mr. 
Butterworth farmed only up to the ditch and would 
seem to indicate that Mr. Butterworth probably used 
the water from the ditch in question to irrigate his 
crops. Defendant, Ben Williams, testified that Leone 
LeCheminant grew crops on what is now the Fuoco 
property up to the west side of the ditch in question 
for two or three years. ( R. 38) . This fact is also recog· 
nized by plaintiffs in their brief at page 8. Plaintiffs' 
witness, Mr. H. Leland Christensen, testified that he 
farmed what is now the plaintiffs' property at one 
tin1e and did use water for irrigating from the par· 
ticular ditch in question. ( R. 135) . This fact was also 
recognized by plaintiffs' witness, Mr. Young, in his 
testimony. (R. 112). 
Plaintiffs' witness, Mrs. Grace D. Young, tes· 
tified that because of a hump located on what is now 
the plaintiffs' property the land was difficult to irri· 
gate and flooding would sometimes occur when an 
attempt was made to irrigate this property. Perhaps 
this is an explanation for plaintiffs' predecessors letting 
the land grow up in weeds for many years. 
The fact that all witnesses testified to the existence 
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of the ditch in question would seem to be evidence 
enough of its visibility. 
Mutual recognition of a boundary line may be 
shown by acquiescence over a long period of time. It 
is not incumbent upon the defendants to show an 
express agreement between themselves and plaintiffs' 
predecessors in the title in order to prevail. An implied 
recognition of a boundary line may be supplied by 
the passage of time. Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 U t.2d 
156, 389 P.2d 143; King vs. Fronk, 14 Ut.2d 135, 378 
P.2d 893; 3 Utah Law Review. 
Plaintiffs' predecessors and the defendants and 
their predecessors have for many years intended that 
this irrigation ditch constitute the boundary line. The 
testimony indicates that the ditch was constructed along 
the east side of the plaintiffs' property for the pur-
pose of irrigating that property and was placed along 
what was considered to be its east boundary. (Old 
R.114 (New R. 4, 7, 10, 90, 126, 130). Since the 
property of the parties slopes from the east to the 
west, it was assumed many years ago that the ditch 
in question was on the boundary line of the two parties. 
It is illogical that, at the time the irrigation ditch was 
constructed, it was not placed on what plaintiffs con-
tend is the boundary line, approximately twenty feet 
east of the position where it was actually located, 
unless the adjacent property owners consi<lered the 
boundary line to be where the ditch was located. The 
land at the time the ditch was constructed was pri-
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marily farm land. The feeder ditch or canal serving 
the plaintiffs' property flowed from the east to west 
to the northeast corner of plaintiffs' property. It would 
have been a simple matter to bring the ditch across 
the road from north to south at the actual record 
boundary to irrigate all of the tract if the boundary line 
were not considered to have been in the location as 
claimed by defendants. When land is being used as 
farm land and is being served by irrigation water, it 
would be unwise, to say the least, for the owner of 
the land not to construct his irrigation ditch on what 
he treated as his property line, so that he would not 
lose the use of any of his property through lack of 
water. It is not logical to say that plaintiffs' predeces-
sors, to be neighborly, allowed a twenty-foot strip of 
their farmland to lie east of the ditch where it could 
not be irrigated so that their neighbors could use the 
land. 
Plaintiffs' predecessors iu title made no objection 
and it was assumed by others living in the area that 
the ditch in question constituted the boundary line 
between the two properties. The plaintiffs have lived in 
this neighborhood for many years themselves and have 
owned and tilled the land adjacent on the south of the 
property they recently acquired from Butterworth. 
They knew of the sale ten or more years ago on the 
south part of the Williams' property to one Hansen 
(the north part of said tract was conveyed to respond-
ents by the said deed of 1950), and know that the 
west line of the tract claimed and occupied by Hansen 
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had been tightly fenced by him since his acquisition 
of that part of the Williams property. (R. 49, 60, 
87); that said fence was in direct line with the fence 
constructed by defendants conveniently close to and 
on the east bank of the irrigation ditch of plaintiffs', 
which had been acquiesced in and recognized for nearly 
fifty years as the division line of these properties. 
Hansen had also constructed a concrete wall and fence 
along the boundary of the property between the lot 
he had acquired from Williams' parents and that of 
defendants. This wall extended all the distance to 
the southwest corner of the land claimed by defend-
ants, down to the said ditch on the line AB. (R. 11, 
12, 61, 68, 79). The whole or former Williams tract, 
as it existed, before the south part thereof was sold 
to Hansen, had a common west boundary, and with 
the lands acquired by plaintiffs recognized all of these 
years. The ditch extends the entire distance of this 
old west line ofthe Williams property, and has done 
so for many years. 
Plaintiffs had personal knowledge, before they 
bought the tract to the west of the Williams tract from 
Butterworth, that this line had already existed for all 
the years they had lived in the neighborhood. They tilled 
the land immediately south of the south side of the 
old Williams property. Plaintiff, Frank Fuoco, indi-
cated in his testimony ·that he did not farm the 25 foot 
strip in dispute located just east of the irrigation ditch 
because he did not know it was his until the recent 
survey was conducted. (R. 53). Plaintiffs did not in-
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tend to buy any land lying east of this line from But-
terworth, but claim to find, after surveying out the 
description in the Butterworth deed to them, that they 
had acquired twenty feet more than they had expected 
to acquire. They now desire that the boundary line be 
changed and moved back to the east about twenty feet, 
after it had been used, acquiesced in, acknowledged, 
and recognized as the property line for nearly fifty 
years. 
Defendant, Benjamin H. \Villiams, testified that 
either he or his father had leased what is now the Fuoco 
property during the period from 1923 or 1924 to 1937 
and one other year sometime between 1940 and 1959. 
( R. 37). Defendants further testified that only the 
crop returns on the land west of the ditch were divided 
on a crop-share basis with their lessor. As to the pro-
ceeds from the crop raised east of the ditch, ~Ir. \Vil-
liams testified that defendants and their predecessors 
retained all proceeds. (R. 40). Defendant, Ben \Vil-
liams, also testified that the ditch in question was used 
to irrigate what is now the plaintiffs' property lying 
to the west of the ditch. (R. 39). Plaintiffs presented 
no evidence whatsoever to contradict this testimony. It 
would seem that the division of crop receipts would be 
significant circumstantial evidence of the acquiescence 
of plaintiffs' predecessors in the ditch as the boundary 
line. 
The landlord-tenant rule would not be controlling 
here since defendants were lessees for only a small 
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portion of the period during which defendants claim 
the ditch was acquiesced in as a boundary line. 
As was pointed out, supra, what is now the plain-
tiffs' property west of the ditch in question, was farmed 
at different intervals of time by .Mr. Butterworth, 
Mr. H. Leland Christensen, and Mr. Leone LeChemi-
nant. The fact that others farmed what is now the 
plaintiffs' property only up to the ditch in question is 
significant evidence of the acquiescence of plaintiffs' 
predecessors in the ditch as a boundary line. 
Plaintiffs contend that the ditch in question was 
not a permanent land mark and hence does not fall 
within the definition of a "monument." In support 
of their contention, on page 14 of their brief plaintiffs 
state that def end ant, Ben \Villi ams, admitted the ditch 
had been moved. This is not true. Though defendant 
stated that the ditch could have moved one or two feet 
either to the east or west he stated that to his knowl-
edge it had not been so moved. ( R. 23, 33). Testimony 
indicated that periodically the ditch required cleaning 
if it was to be of satisfactory use. (R. 34). The record 
points out that one way of cleaning the ditch is to 
plow it out. (R. 34). It is possible that as a result of 
this cleaning process or of erosion taking place that 
the ditch might shift slightly to the east or the west. 
Defendant, Ben Williams, was merely being realistic 
when he testified that the ditch could have shifted to 
the east or west--0ne or two feet. 
As was pointed out, supra, the location of the ditch 
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was not an issue in the present trial; however, plain. 
tiffs insist on reviving this issue in their current appe]. 
late brief (page 12). Since it was determined by the 
Lower Court that it was not the intent of the Supreme 
Court that the issue concerning the location of the ditch 
in question be relitigated, the fact that certain of plain-
tiffs' witnesses testified in the present trial that the 
ditch was not located where the jury had determined 
it to be would seem to be immaterial. As to that issue 
the jury's finding in the previous suit would be bind-
ing and the doctrine of res judicata should be applied. 
l\iiatthews vs. Matthews et al., 102 Ut. 428, 132 P.2d 
lll. 
It might be noted, however, that the testimonies 
of plaintiffs' \vitnesses in the present trial, with respect 
to the location of the ditch in question, conflict either 
with their testimonies given in the previous trial and 
are inconsistent with each other in some respects in the 
present trial. 
At one point in his testimony plaintiff, Frank 
Fuoco, testified that he at no time had knowledge of 
any ditch in the area in dispute. (R. 46, 47). Plain· 
tiffs' witness, Mrs. Young, testified that plaintiff, Mr. 
Fuoco, at one time attempted to irrigate by using that 
ditch, which she referred to as being the original ditch, 
which she testified ran along the west boundary of the 
'Villiams' property. (R. 129, 131). In the previous 
trial, where the issue as to the location of the ditch 
was in dispute, plaintiffs' witness, Owen Sander, lo· 
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cated the ditch along Line AB by drawing a line with 
a dark pencil on Exhibit P-1 down the north side of 
the road, then crossing the road to Point A on the 
Exhibit, then south to his property. (R. of previous 
trial at 113). Mr. Frank Young, witness for plaintiff, 
at one point in his testimony states that the water 
ran south across the road and then turned west and 
after running west for some distance it could be turned 
into a ditch running south across the east side of what 
is now the Fuoco property. (R. 107). 
If any confusion exists as to the exact surveyed 
location of the east bank of said ditch, it is cured and 
made unmistakeably clear and precise by that descrip-
tion in the judgment rendered by the lower court in 
the previous trial which describes, with meticulous care, 
the legal or metes and bounds description of the prop-
erty found to be owned by defendants. This is the 
description of the property set forth in the warranty 
deed whereby the mother of the defendant, Ben 'Vil-
liams, conveyed this land to him in 1950. (R. 11). 
It is the same tract occupied solely and claimed by 
defendants and the parents of the defendant, Benjamin 
H. Williams, for more than 30 - more nearly 50 -
consecutive years. It is the tract upon which defend-
ants have paid the taxes since the tract was conveyed 
in 1950 to them. (R. 11). The evidence is uncontra-
dicted on these items, and the testimony adduced at 
the trial was clear and unequivocal relating to the years 
of occupancy by defendants, and as to their said long 
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years of tilling and caring for this tract as their own 
property to the exclusion of all persons. 
Recognition of a boundary line by adjoining prop-
erty owners may be shown by implication. Nunley v~. 
Walker, 13 Ut.2d 105, 369 P.2d 117. The defendants 
may acquire title by acquiescence if their use has been 
for a sufficient length of time. King vs. Fronk, 14 
Ut.2d 135, 378 P.2d 893; Nunley vs. Walker, supra; 
Affleck vs. 1\iforgan, 12 Ut.2d 200, 364 P.2d 663; 
Harding vs. Allen, 10 Ut.2d 370, 353 P.2d 991. 
This Honorable Court stated in the case of King 
vs. Fronk, supra: 
"Besides a, visible, persisting boundary having 
been shown over a long period of time is con· 
vincing evidencee of an intended or acquiesced 
in boundary. Under such circumstances, it would 
seem that in the nature of things, it is incumbent 
upon him who assails it to show by competent 
evidence that a boundary was not thus es tab· 
lished ... " 
'Vhether or not defendants' and plaintiffs' pre<le· 
cessors "mutually recognized" the ditch as a boundary 
between the parcels is atnply demonstrated by their 
acquiescense in the ditch as a boundary line far in excess 
of twenty-five (25) years. It was only after the y~ar 
1950 when the appellants purchased the property lo· 
cate<l west of the ditch in question that this contest arose. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the first trial on this matter the trial judge de-
termined that there was but one issue of fact in dispute 
between the parties. That issue was the location, in 
regard to the disputed tract, of an irrigation ditch that 
had been serving the appellants' property for over 
twenty-five years. Plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Fuoco, 
maintained that the old ditch was no longer in the same 
location and that it had originally been located along 
Line CD of Exhibit P-1. Defendants contended that 
the ditch was the same as that in existence now and 
that such was located along Line AB. This issue was 
resolved by the jury in favor of the defendants. On 
appeal, by plaintiffs, this Honorable Court reversed 
the judgment and remanded such for a new trial stating: 
"The judge or jury should determine the mat-
ters of whether the ditch was acquiesced in over 
a long period of time, as a boundary and not 
simply as an irrigation medium." 
Though testimony was offered at the time of the 
new trial concerning the location of the irrigation ditch 
the Lower Court concluded that it was not the intent 
of this Honorable Court on remand that this issue be 
relitigated. The Lower Court then determined that the 
only issue to be resolved at the new trial was whether 
or not this particular ditch had been acquiesced in for 
a sufficiently long period of time as a boundary line. 
This latter issue was heard by the court sitting without 
a jury and was correctly resolved in favor of the de-
fendants. This is the second appeal by the plaintiffs. 
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Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient competent 
evidence to refute defendants' claim to the land lying 
cast of the ditch. The record clearly demonstrates that 
plaintiffs' predecessors arn1 defendants and their prede· 
cesors for well over twenty-five ( 25) years acquiesced 
in this particular ditch as a bouudary line. It is clear 
from the testimony of the various witnesses that de-
fendants have used and occupied the land in dispute 
up to this ditch under daim of title and to the exclusion 
of all others during this long period of time. The testi-
mony of plaintiffs' witnesses also clearly indicates that 
plaintiffs' predecessors were well aware of the ditch 
and that they or their tenants during various intervals 
of time farmed up to and, only up to, the west bank of 
the ditch in question and used water from said ditcb 
for purposes of irrigation. 
The defendants' mother, m deeding the property 
to the defendants' included the disputed parcel when 
she conveyed to them in the year 1950. This convey· 
ance is another indication that the respondents an<l 
their predecessors had considered and treated the irri· 
gation ditch as being the boundary line between par· 
ties' respective tracts of land. Further, the fact that 
IIansen, after his acquisition of the south part of the 
\Villiams property, constructed a fence on what he 
considered at that time to be his west boundary, di-
rectly in line with the cast bank of the ditch in question, 
as is indicated by Line AB on Exhibit P-1, is evidence 
that it was assumed by others living in the area that 
the ditch in question constituted the boundary. 
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The property in question has changed in value con-
siderably from that of farm property to that of com-
mercial property because it now adjoins a shopping 
center. In the case of King vs. Fronk, supra, this IIonor-
able Court appropriately describes the motivating 
factor in the instant case when it stated: 
''The rub comes when, after many years, land 
value appreciation tempts a test of the vulner-
ability of a claimed ancient boundary." 
Ilespondcnts respectfully submit that the judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
:MILTON A. 01\:IAN 
701 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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